Examining Anti-China Sentiment and the Grievance Structure of the Diaspora through the Actions of Mostan

Introduction

On July 14, 2025, political controversy began when Mostan, known as Dan Hyun-myung in Korea and a former international criminal justice ambassador, entered South Korea. Thousands gathered at Incheon Airport, and there were even urgent situations where individuals carrying weapons were apprehended among the welcoming crowd. Mostan announced plans to speak at far-right events, such as CPAC Korea, but some of his schedules were canceled due to fierce backlash from civil society and academia. His main claim was that "the Chinese Communist Party intervened in the elections of the Republic of Korea, resulting in a manipulated regime." Mostan's statements symbolize the phenomenon of far-right political discourse from overseas right-wing figures entering and spreading within the country, going beyond mere conspiracy theory. In particular, this aligns with past remarks from individuals of Chinese and Hong Kong descent, such as Annie Chen and her husband, raising concerns that their discourse is influencing parts of the conservative camp in Korea, large churches, and young far-right groups. On July 18, 2025, Park Gu-yong, a philosophy professor at Chonnam National University, analyzed this phenomenon from philosophical and historical perspectives during an appearance on TBS's "Kim Eo-jun's Humility is Hard News Factory." He diagnosed that anti-China sentiment operates as a complex structure, not merely as a diplomatic conflict or policy issue, but also stems from a sense of resentment of the diaspora (ressentiment), the internalization of orientalism rooted in colonial history, and the domestic transplantation of international far-right discourse. This essay aims to analyze the deep structure of anti-China sentiment spread in Korean society, starting from Mostan's entry and the Annie Chen controversy.

Reactions and Controversies After Entering Mostan

Mostan entered through Incheon Airport on July 14, 2025. There were many members of far-right groups and self-proclaimed 'defenders of democracy' present at the scene, and some of them were reported to be carrying firearms or holding extreme placards. In particular, a man in his 50s was apprehended while attempting to pass through the airport security checkpoint with a loaded handgun, triggering an emergency response from airport security authorities. Mostan had announced plans to give a lecture at Seoul National University, attend a conference co-hosted by the city of Seoul, and deliver a speech at CPAC Korea however, most of his schedule was reduced or canceled due to opposition from civil society and academia. Citizen groups from 55 cities in 12 foreign countries that opposed his entry issued a joint statement expressing concern over the South Korean government's entry permit and calling for legal action. Through this process, Mostan became positioned not just as a foreign guest, but at the intersection where international political dynamics and domestic political discourse connect.

The connection between the statements of Anichen and Mostan

Mostan has repeatedly claimed in several interviews and speeches since his entry that the Chinese Communist Party has intervened in South Korea's elections in 2022 and 2024. He reported this to the U.S. Department of Justice and the Directorate of National Intelligence (DNI), stating that 'the Trump administration will use this as a basis to strike the South Korean regime.' Parallel to such claims is the figure of Annie Chen. Since 2019, Annie Chen has been exposing human rights abuses in mainland China through YouTube and lectures, particularly focusing on victims of the one-child policy and the Tiananmen Square incident. Chen's husband is originally from Hong Kong and has also made critical statements about mainland China. Recently, he seems to be fostering anti-China discourse linked to the political situation in South Korea. Professor Park Gu-yong points out that the statements of these two individuals share a very similar narrative structure. This follows the template that 'China is the oppressor, and free democratic countries like South Korea and the United States must resist this.' Such a frame initially defines China as politically and morally 'evil,' closely intertwining with conspiracy theories that reduce all domestic issues to interventions by external hostile forces.

Political Structure of Diaspora Ressentiment

Professor Park Gu-yong analyzes that the anti-China discourse is not merely a political incitement but arises from the 'ressentiment of the diaspora,' meaning the feelings of resentment held by those who have escaped or been exiled from mainland China. He mentions his interactions with Chinese intellectuals during his studies in Germany, explaining that they could not have siblings due to the one-child policy and shared a sense of guilt and trauma regarding children who were hidden or abandoned at birth. This experience does not remain as mere personal suffering but develops into a structural resentment towards the Chinese government. Professor Park explains this using Friedrich Nietzsche's concept of 'ressentiment.' This emotional structure involves the wronged blaming the powerful morally and attributing their helplessness to external factors. The political agendas proposed by entities like Anichen or Mostan embody this emotional structure, which is expressed as a sophisticated political discourse in conjunction with the overseas anti-China community.

International Far-Right Network and Discourse Dissemination

Mostan is not just a simple personal greeting it is closely connected to the extreme right network of the Trump camp, particularly organizations like CPAC and KAFSP (Korea-U.S. Security Policy Forum). These far-right organizations share similar strategies globally, emphasizing external threats (usually from China or immigrants) to rally domestic conservative forces and fostering distrust in the electoral system. This strategy resembles the movements of Trump's support base after the 2020 U.S. elections. Denying election results, claiming foreign interference from hostile external forces, and reinforcing patriotic sentiments resonate appealingly with the far-right forces in Korea. Professor Park analyzes that this international network is being channeled into Korea through large churches, young far-right groups, and YouTube media. The statements by Mostan and Annichen are representative examples of this imported discourse.

Colonial Historical Background and Internalized Orientalism

Professor Park Gu-yong believes that this anti-China sentiment is not merely a recent import of ideology. He traces its roots back to the late Joseon Dynasty and the establishment of the Korean Empire, as well as the Japanese colonial period. The Joseon government invited Japanese troops to suppress the Donghak Peasant Revolution, while Japan presented itself as a 'liberator' and China as a 'ruler of vassal states.' This narrative later became the justification for the pro-Japanese forces' anti-China stance. After the colonial period, South Korea diplomatically severed ties with China and has long regarded it as a 'threat.' This internalized anti-China sentiment has become entrenched in education, culture, and political discourse throughout modern history. Professor Park cites Franz Fanon's analysis, explaining that colonizers make the colonized people view themselves 'through the eyes of their oppressors.' Ultimately, Korea's anti-China sentiment is not just a result of external discourse but also the outcome of a deeply ingrained colonial perspective and orientalist views.

Complex integration with economic, political, and religious structures

The discourse of Mosdan and Anichen is connected to economic interests. Kim Eo-jun pointed out that Anichen has conflicts of interest in the nuclear-related industry with China, while Professor Park interpreted this as a structural rent that combines anti-China capital and Korean far-right capital rather than a simple personal business. Additionally, this discourse is circulating in a form that combines religious slogans and nationalist sentiment, in conjunction with some large churches in Korea. They define the Chinese Communist Party as 'Satan' and argue that 'Korea must align with the United States to survive.' In this process, some young people are rapidly becoming far-right as they are exposed to this discourse, and content spread through YouTube is having a significant impact on distorting public opinion.

Conclusion

The entry of Mostan in July 2025 and subsequent statements, along with the related remarks by Anichen, can be seen not merely as the free political expression of a foreigner, but as a real-time manifestation of a complex interplay of political, economic, religious, and philosophical structures. These statements trigger anti-China sentiments within Korean society, and this sentiment is intertwined with Orientalism, which originates from colonial history, and is systematically disseminated through international far-right networks. At the foundation lies the structural resentment felt by individuals of diaspora backgrounds, known as ressentiment, which is utilized as a psychological asset to justify political discourse. If Korean society approaches this issue merely as an ideological debate, the social division and the manipulation of international politics may deepen further. Therefore, addressing this issue requires multifaceted efforts, including philosophical insights, institutional oversight, and strengthening the responsibility of education and media. It is essential for the preservation of Korean democracy to confront the structure of this anti-China sentiment, trace its origins within history, and analyze the channels through which it is disseminated today.