Examining China's Perception from South Korea Through the Lens of Xi Jinping's Rumored Downfall - Misunderstanding, Hatred, and the Absence of Strategy

Xi Jinping's Fall from Power: A Typical Fabricated Narrative

In the first half of 2025, some domestic and foreign media outlets reported en masse that Xi Jinping, the President of China, had either fallen from power or was about to do so. The theory of 'Xi Jinping's downfall' spread without specific internal information, based on the purging of high-ranking military officials and the fact that he does not frequently appear in public. However, this is more akin to a politically motivated manipulation mixed with the hopes of external political forces, completely unrelated to reality. The structure of the Chinese military is different from that of ordinary countries. It is not commonly referred to as the 'National Army,' but rather the 'Party Army.' In other words, the People's Liberation Army of China is under the control of the Communist Party of China, not owned by the state. The highest body of the Party, the Central Committee, controls the military through the Central Military Commission, the chair of which concurrently serves as the head of state. This means that Xi Jinping personally stands at the pinnacle of the Party, and military personnel matters are also under his control. In reality, military purges have been repeatedly carried out in the context of corruption eradication and strengthening the Party's authority, and this does not necessarily signify the political downfall of a leader. Proposing a theory of downfall based on military purges demonstrates a lack of understanding of the Chinese system. Furthermore, the argument of 'loss of military control' to support the theory of Xi Jinping's downfall is a result of a subjective interpretation of foreign news reports without a basic understanding of the Party-military relationship structure. Such narratives are primarily produced by conservative political forces in the United States or Japan, or by associated media outlets, and are then repeatedly reproduced by some conservative domestic media or YouTube channels. This is merely a political narrative created by 'wishful thinking' rather than reality.

Import and Diffusion of Anti-Chinese Sentiment

The deep-seated anti-China sentiment in Korean society has intensified recently. Anti-Chinese expressions have become commonplace on far-right YouTube channels and internet communities, and politically, China is often depicted as an "axis of evil." However, this sentiment did not arise from Korea's unique national feelings. Anti-China sentiment is a result of the direct "import" of the strategic framework used by Japan's far-right forces. Since the late 20th century, Japan's far-right has consistently maintained an anti-communist, anti-North, and anti-China framework. Their strategy was to stimulate conservative nationalist sentiments to secure political influence, with the core being the "China threat theory." Within Japan, anti-Korean and anti-Chinese literature exists in dedicated sections of major bookstores, indicating a solid ideological industry. This strategy was actively absorbed and intensified by Korea's far-right forces and YouTube-based media. Particularly during the administration of President Yoon Seok-yeol, anti-China discourse was widely circulated in the political arena and media, establishing a structure through which conservative YouTube channels generate views and revenue. Far-right YouTubers have reached a level where they criticize China as if it were a political doctrine and even use insulting remarks such as "Are you Chinese?" towards police or politicians. This goes beyond mere hate speech, acting as a dangerous element that undermines diplomatic balance and limits options for national strategy. Hate-based diplomacy causes a loss of practicality and strategic flexibility, creating a diplomatic environment where emotions overwhelm rationality.

The Absence of Practical Diplomacy and Strategic Contradictions

The Yoon Suk-yeol government's foreign policy has been based on the banner of 'pragmatic diplomacy' since its inception. While emphasizing trilateral security cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan, it also aims to consider practical relations with China and Russia simultaneously. This reflects the reality that international dynamics cannot be easily reduced to simple ideological divides. However, for pragmatic diplomacy to take root in reality, 'strategy' must operate rather than mere 'emotion.' Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, China has implicitly tolerated the 'prolongation of the war' as the U.S. strategic focus shifted to Europe. The Chinese Foreign Minister stated, "If Russia is defeated, the U.S. will target China directly," revealing a strategy to delay U.S. interventions in East Asia through the extension of the Ukraine conflict. This illustrates China's intention to secure a diplomatic buffer zone while avoiding direct confrontation with the U.S. At the same time, China faces the practical challenge of strengthening its economic cooperation with the European Union. The EU maintains a firm stance that it will not resume trade negotiations if China continues to maintain an excessively close relationship with Russia. Thus, China is also engaging in sophisticated diplomacy to strike a balance within this complex multilateral strategy. In order to survive in such a multifaceted strategic environment, South Korea needs practical diplomacy centered on national interests rather than being trapped in anti-China sentiment. While the alliance with the U.S. is important, it is not feasible to abandon relations with China. Cooperation with China remains an unavoidable reality, especially in various fields such as economy, trade, culture, and supply chains.

Conclusion: Hatred without strategy, emotions without diplomacy

The attitude of Korean society towards China is gradually deteriorating from hatred to fanaticism, and is transforming from realistic understanding to political symbolism. There is a tendency to believe false information as fact, such as rumors about Xi Jinping's downfall, and to transplant the external anti-China framework into domestic politics, while foreign policy is swayed by emotions. This trend is not merely a matter of public opinion, but a structural issue that fundamentally weakens Korea's diplomatic autonomy and strategic options. Diplomacy is a function of interests, not emotions. If we continue to respond emotionally in our relations with China, we will inevitably become isolated in the realities of international politics. Therefore, what is needed now is a balanced understanding and practical judgment. China is not an entity to like or dislike, but a diplomatic reality that must be understood coldly and responded to strategically. For the Lee Jae-myung administration to achieve practical diplomacy, the public opinion, media, and political circles must all escape from the swamp of emotions. How we engage with China is our problem. However, how we misunderstand China serves as a barometer showing whose frame we are trapped in. It is time to conduct diplomacy led by autonomous judgment and strategy, rather than imported hatred.