The significance of the passage of the three broadcasting laws and national defense, the way to return broadcasting to the people

Introduction

Today, the political neutrality and independence of public broadcasting in Korean society have been repeatedly challenged. In particular, the structure where the composition of broadcasting company boards and the appointment process of presidents are excessively influenced by political circles, especially the current government or ruling party, has been a target of criticism for a long time. Although public broadcasting should be a public asset for the entire nation, in reality, it has been maintained with the influence of specific political forces structurally ingrained. This reality threatens core democratic principles of media freedom and fair information dissemination. Against this backdrop, on July 7, 2025, the amendment to the three broadcasting laws that passed the National Assembly's Science, Technology, Information, Broadcasting and Communications Committee is not just a simple legal amendment. It is a structural reform aiming to separate the governance of public broadcasting from political circles and to return the ownership of broadcasting to the people. This amendment includes groundbreaking systems such as the diversification of board composition, public participation in the selection of presidents, and the consent system for appointing news directors, and it will serve as the first step in directly addressing the long-standing ills of the broadcasting structure.

Current Structural Issues

Under the current broadcasting-related laws, the boards of directors of major public broadcasters such as KBS, MBC (Korea Broadcasting System), and EBS have been entirely formed through recommendations from political circles. Particularly when the ruling party holds a majority in the National Assembly, the directors recommended by the ruling party have come to dominate the board, exerting decisive influence in core decision-making processes such as the appointment of the president. In fact, there have been controversies surrounding the replacement of public broadcaster CEOs and interference in program production under various administrations in the past, which have seriously undermined the independence and credibility of the media. A more significant problem is that this structure allows for "covert intervention." While it appears that procedures are being followed on the surface, in reality, the intentions of the Blue House or ruling party are reflected in the board of directors, thereby influencing CEO appointments and programming policies. Under such a distorted structure, broadcasting loses its function of criticising power and repeatedly becomes a tool of politics. Unless this issue is resolved, public broadcasting does not deserve to maintain the name "public."

Content and Significance of the Amendments to the Broadcasting Three Laws

The proposed amendment to the broadcasting law is designed to fundamentally reform such structural problems. The core contents of the bill can be summarized in three main points. First, the diversification of the board of directors. The amendment expands the number of members on the public broadcasting boards and diversifies the entities that can make recommendations. KBS increases its board size from 11 to 15 members, while MBC and EBS each increase to 13 members, dismantling the existing monopoly on recommendations by political parties. The allocation for negotiation groups is 6 members for KBS and 5 members each for MBC and EBS, with the Democratic Party recommending 4 members for KBS and 3 members each for MBC and EBS. This does not even reach 30% of the total number of directors, and is structured so that no single party can independently dominate the board. Second, the citizen participation-based president selection system. Previously, the president was elected by a majority of politically appointed directors, but the amendment introduces the 'Citizen Participation-based President Recommendation Committee.' This committee is composed of more than 100 citizens randomly selected to reflect the diversity of the population in terms of gender, age, and region. Third, the appointment consent system for news managers. The amendment also includes a 'news manager appointment consent system' to institutionally ensure the autonomy of reporting.

Summary of misunderstandings and rebuttals

Some argue that the broadcasting reform laws are an attempt by the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions to take control of the media. However, this is a clear distortion. First, the viewer committee is a legal entity, and its composition is overseen by the heads of the broadcasting companies. It is not randomly composed by civic groups, and the composition process is thoroughly institutionalized. Furthermore, unions at KBS, MBC, and others operate under a multi-union system, and there is no structure that allows a specific union to monopolize the right to recommend. The claim that the Democratic Party will dominate the board of directors is also untrue. The Democratic Party has only 4 out of 15 KBS board members, and under the special majority system, it cannot unilaterally pass the appointment of the president or important decisions. On the contrary, various social entities are involved as recommenders, reinforcing a structure of balance and autonomy rather than bias.

Field Responses and Institutional Expected Effects

The media and broadcasting professionals generally respond positively to this amendment. In particular, organizations such as the Journalists Association and the Broadcasting Journalists Union evaluate this law as progress that institutionally guarantees the independence of broadcasting and structurally blocks political interference. In the case of the appointment agreement for the head of reporting, some broadcasting companies are already implementing it autonomously through collective agreements, and this legal amendment signifies the institutionalization of that trend. If the management transparency of broadcasting companies and the fairness of reporting are improved, the public's trust will naturally recover. The symbols of 'a president made by the people' and 'a newsroom monitored by the people' will serve as important turning points for public broadcasting to return to its original role.

Conclusion

The Broadcasting Three Laws are not simply a revision of some clauses. They represent an institutional reform that liberates public broadcasting from being a political tool and returns it to the people. By separating the structure of the board from political influence and allowing citizens to directly participate in the selection of the president, broadcasting will finally have the foundation to fulfill its public duties. The independence of broadcasting goes beyond press freedom it is directly linked to the health of democracy. Fair information delivery ensures citizens' right to know, fulfills the function of power oversight, and serves as a medium for social integration. The revision of the Broadcasting Three Laws is a significant first step toward the recovery of these democratic values. The remaining stages are the passing of the legislation through the Judiciary Committee and the plenary session. When citizens maintain their interest and raise their voices in support, this reform will be completed. It is time to join this historic journey of returning broadcasting to the people. The Broadcasting Three Laws are not a slogan, but a change. Now is the time to start.